On July 8, President Trump announced the annulment of the MoU with Iran in response to the IRGC strikes on three vessels in the Strait of Hormuz. The announcement was followed by a massive U.S. bombardment of Iranian strategic assets, and retaliatory Iranian strikes on U.S. assets in Kuwait, Bahrain, and Jordan. The resumption of hostilities once again threatens to embroil the region in conflict and endanger global energy security as the IRGC announced the closure of the Strait of Hormuz.
The Iranian leadership, however, expressed its regret over the attack on vessels in the Strait of Hormuz. According to reports, Iranian officials privately conveyed to President Trump’s advisers that the attacks were carried out by hardliners in Iran. The Iranian civilian leadership also expressed its intention to continue the negotiation process.
These attacks by the IRGC hardliners illustrate a prominent political cleavage in Iran. The civilian leadership, comprising the Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, the Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and the Speaker of the Parliament Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, had been advocating a diplomatic way out of the war. They were instrumental in negotiating with the Americans and concluding the memorandum of understanding.
The military leadership of the IRGC, supported by the new Supreme Leader of Iran, Mojtaba Khamenei, represents the hardline faction of Iran. Driven by the radical ideology of export of revolution and proxy networks, the hardliners are palpably concerned about maintaining their grip on power. They are often considered to act like a state within a state, beyond the control of the civilian leadership and undermining its writ.
This control over power has greatly augmented in the aftermath of February 28 as the U.S. and Israel waged a war on Iran. The IRGC exerted its influence in key appointments, vividly rejecting the discretion of the President. The IRGC also maintains a discernible control over the domestic economic framework, with no accountability for its finances. This control over the economy also magnified as the war embroiled Iran and the Strait of Hormuz, thus further elevating the stakes of the IRGC.
The successful conclusion of the memorandum of understanding between Iran and the U.S. was hailed as a major diplomatic victory for Iran, but more specifically for its civilian leadership. The moderate, pro-diplomacy civilian leadership faced stern opposition from the hardliners in their quest to find a diplomatic solution during the war. The MoU was reluctantly accepted by the new Supreme Leader of Iran, Mojtaba Khamenei, as he openly expressed his skepticism of diplomatic engagement with the U.S..
The signing of the MoU, followed by the lifting of sanctions on Iran, negotiations for the release of Iranian monetary assets and a license to sell oil for 60 days, injected a new spirit into Iranian civilian leadership. This, however, comes at the cost of hardliners’ grip on power, who view the resurgence of civilians’ preeminence as a direct challenge to their authority. Peace, at the moment, is incompatible with the interests of the IRGC hardliners, who seek to benefit from the resumption of hostilities.
The recent IRGC attacks on vessels passing through the Strait of Hormuz signify this very intention of the Iranian hardliners. The vessels did not violate the understanding between the U.S. and Iran by navigating through the Omani waters. The hardliners’ insistence on ships navigating through Iranian waters illustrates the coercive nature of the IRGC, which aims to extract a toll in the near future from ships navigating solely through the Iranian waters.
This also attenuates the efforts of the civilian leadership, which hinted at an amicable arrangement with Oman, charging fees through a collaborative mechanism after 60 days of the MoU. The nearsighted and belligerent approach of the IRGC hardliners reflects defiance of the civilian leadership for its own interests.
Additionally, these attacks were carried out on vessels belonging to Qatar, an important mediator between the U.S. and Iran. This not only distanced a mediator-cum-ally but also appears to delay the release of Iran’s $12 billion held in Qatari banks. The annulment of the ceasefire by President Trump, the reimposition of sanctions and the reversal of the oil license tarnish months-long progress of the civilian leadership.
The IRGC hardliners appear to be acting outside the authority of the civilian leadership, causing frenzy in the region in order to sustain its grip on power. What can be termed the civil-military divide or the moderate-hardliner divide in Iran is influencing its strategic decisions. The two divergent factions appear to be operating in dissonance, with the IRGC hardliners hampering the peace efforts of moderate civilians. The IRGC Navy has once again announced the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, creating uncertainty for global energy security. The oil prices are surging amidst halted navigation through the naval corridor. The civilian leadership is again attempting damage control. However, prospects of peace efforts appear bleak due to hardliners’ attempts to undermine the civilian leadership and solidify their grip on power.
Hamza Zaman is an Assistant Research Associate at the Islamabad Policy Research Institute, Pakistan. He holds an M.Phil. degree in International Relations from Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad, Pakistan.
