A Mutual Benefit Agreement
The United States and the Taliban signed the Doha Accord on 29 February 2020 to end the war that began after al-Qaeda, then sheltered by the Taliban, carried out the 11 September 2001 attacks. The accord committed the U.S. to withdraw within fourteen months, and it obligated the Taliban to conduct peaceful negotiations with the democratically elected Afghan government, to deny Afghan soil to al-Qaeda and other terrorist adversaries, and to negotiate with Kabul. The U.S. honored the withdrawal timeline, but the Taliban seized the country by force, instead of diplomatic means, in August 2021. This is concerning because the Taliban chose to discard the part of the agreement on negotiation, so it is reasonably safe to assume they may restore Afghanistan as a terrorist sanctuary.
U.S. policy on the country should proceed from national interest, consistent with the Trump administration’s America First strategy. This article reviews three courses of action, namely intensified isolation, engagement through regional partners, or a direct but conditional partnership with the Taliban grounded in a shared interest. It recommends the third.
The U.S. interest in Afghanistan is to prevent any terrorist organization from using the country as a base to plan and train for external attacks on U.S. soil. With the conflict in Iran and the preparation of a denial strategy in the Pacific against China’s aggression, the U.S. cannot afford to intervene militarily in the country again. According to a 2 April 2024 Congressional Research Service report, terrorist groups in Afghanistan are a major concern, and the U.S. currently has no military or diplomatic presence in the country.
For two decades the U.S. sought to build a functioning democratic Afghan state militarily strong enough to deny terrorists its territory. American forces removed the Taliban within weeks in 2001 but never destroyed the group. The Taliban quickly recaptured Kabul in August 2021, weeks after the U.S. withdrew.
The Taliban still has a relationship with al-Qaeda. It allowed Ayman al-Zawahiri, one of the planners of 9/11, to live in the capital of the country. The U.S. conducted a raid in 2022 that eliminated the terrorist leader. The Taliban likewise tolerates the Pakistani Taliban (TTP), which, as the name suggests, is the Taliban equivalent in Pakistan. Pakistan launched airstrikes on TTP compounds in Afghan territory in early 2026. Outside of the relationship with these terrorist regimes, a modern Great Game is being perpetrated by Russia and China. Russia extended recognition to the Taliban government in July 2025, the first permanent member of the UN Security Council to do so, while China pursues de facto recognition tied to mining concessions and presses Kabul to constrain Uyghur militants. Isolation of the Taliban is not a viable strategy.
Since the U.S. invasion, the Afghan state depended on external financing, with the U.S. alone providing well over one hundred billion dollars between 2001 and 2021. That dependence outlasted the Republic. The Taliban inherited a treasury severed from the international banking system and from billions of dollars in central bank reserves frozen abroad, and it governs a population nearly half of which requires humanitarian assistance.
Afghanistan possessed a weak economy before the invasion, and its gross domestic product expanded as U.S. investment and assistance flowed in. Since the takeover, output measured in dollars appears to have withstood the loss of U.S. aid, rising from roughly $14B in 2021 to $18B in 2024. Surprisingly, the Taliban has not shattered the Afghan economy, but, judging by the numbers, the country’s financial state is weaker under the Taliban, and the country is excluded from the world economy, making it more difficult for the government’s income to continue growing.
The Taliban doesn’t possess a unified opinion towards al-Qaeda; however, the country does host elements of al-Qaeda. But not all the Taliban agree with this unofficial policy. In the Bob Woodward book Obama’s Wars, he states that, within the Obama administration’s deliberations on an Afghanistan policy, “Not all members of the Taliban were glad to have hosted al Qaeda.” It is important to note that the Taliban denies involvement in the 9/11 attacks, and none of the hijackers were Taliban; they were al-Qaeda operatives, predominantly Saudi. This is a fact. This does not absolve the Taliban of harboring the plotters, but it establishes that the two are distinct movements, one whose divisible interests can be engaged and influenced rather than merely contained.
The first option is isolation. The U.S. could tighten sanctions, continue to disrupt Taliban financing, and withhold recognition and legitimacy. But this may not work, since Russia and China have officially recognized the new government as legitimate.
The second option is engagement through regional partners. Use Pakistan, Qatar, the Gulf states, and Afghanistan’s neighbors to help eliminate terrorists operating in Afghanistan. It distributes the burden and exploits relationships already active in Kabul, but these intermediaries do not share U.S. priorities. It is always good to remember that Bin Laden effectively lived just a mile from the Pakistani military academy.
The third option is a conditional partnership. Establish a direct channel with the Taliban. Judge any deal by real evidence of the terrorist group being denied a home in the country rather than verbal or written assurances. In a September 2026 interview with CBS News, its spokesman, Abdul Qahar Balkhi, stated that the government desires formal diplomatic ties with the U.S., would welcome the reopening of the U.S. Embassy, and seeks American investment in the mineral and gas sectors. He reaffirmed the Taliban’s Doha commitment against the use of Afghan soil for attacks on other states and disavowed any association with terrorists.
The 2025 National Security Strategy articulates an America First doctrine that evaluates foreign policy against a focused conception of the national interest and repudiates the indefinite global commitments earlier administrations sustained without commensurate return. A conditional partnership protects the homeland from terrorism and lessens Russia and China’s influence, without exhausting critically needed troops or the side quest of nation building.
The U.S. intervened in Afghanistan in 2001 because an organization the Taliban had sheltered attacked the homeland. It withdrew in 2021 and the Taliban seized the opportunity to reestablish their control of the country. The Taliban is the authority with which U.S. policy must now contend and work with. But the Taliban’s stronghold on Afghanistan is not as muscular as it claims; the economy is terrible and grasping for investment dollars. The U.S. has the financial ability to invest in the country’s mineral and gas extraction dependent on an agreement that the country does not become a training ground for terrorists who can perpetrate attacks on the homeland. A conditional partnership would benefit both countries.
Darrell Allen II is a graduate student in Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University. The views expressed are his own.
notes:
• Abdul Qahar Balkhi, interview by Imtiaz Tyab, CBS News, September 15, 2026.
• Congressional Research Service, Terrorist Groups in Afghanistan, In Focus IF10604, April 2, 2024.
• “China’s Accommodation of Taliban 2.0,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, November 2025.
• “Taliban Support Fuels Deadlier Terrorist Attacks in Pakistan, UN Report,” Asia News Network, 2026.
• “Taliban Denies Afghanistan Is a Haven for Terrorists,” FDD’s Long War Journal, June 30, 2025.
• Bob Woodward, Obama’s Wars (New York, Simon & Schuster, 2010), 229.
